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SUBJECT: SPECULATION ON FORMATION OF NEW FINNISH GOVERNMENT

REF: HELSINKI 1953

1. SUMMARY: THE FALL OF MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT HAS NATURALLY SPARKED SPECULATION RE ITS SUCCESSOR. SPECUALTION COVERS THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF MAJORITY, MINORITY AND "NON-POLITICAL" GOVERNMENTS. SEVERAL CRITICAL FACTORS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE PERSON OF PRESIDENT KEKKONEN HIMSELF. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT WILL BE HE WHO DETERMINES HOW AND WHEN A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED AND, TO A MAJOR EXTENT, WHICH PARTIES WILL PARTICIPATE IN IT. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FALL OF THE MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT SEPTEMBER 17 HAS NATURALLY BEEN FOLLOWED BY A FLOOD OF SPECULATION CONCERNING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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WHEN A NEW GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE FORMED AND WHAT ITS

COMPOSITION MIGHT BE. SPECULATION RUNS VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES WITH ALMOST NO POSSIBILITY BEING COMPLETELY RULED OUT, ALTHOUGH SOME ARE CONSIDERED LESS LIKELY THAN OTHERS.

3. BELOW IS A LIST OF POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT COMBINATIONS IN NO PARTICULAR ORDER OF PROBABILITY. AS AN AID TO EVALUATION, READERS ARE REMINDED THAT THE CURRENT PARTY LINE-UP IN THE 200-MEMBER EDUSKUNTA IS: SOCIAL DEMO-CRATIC PARTY (SDP) - 54 MEMBERS; FINNISH PEOPLES DEMO-CRATIC LEAGUE (SKDL) - 40; CENTER PARTY - 39; CONSERVA-TIVE PARTY - 35; SWEDISH PEOPLES PARTY (RKP) - 10; LIBERAL PEOPLES PARTY (LKP) - 9; CHRISTIAN LEAGUE - 9; AND OTHERS -4. POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT COMBINATIONS: A. FIVE-PARTY MAJORITY GOVERNMENT OF COMMUNIST-FRONT SKDL, SDP, CENTER, LKP AND RKP. THIS WOULD REPEAT THE SAME PARTIES OF THE CURRENT COALITION IN RESHUFFLED FORM. B. FOUR-PARTY MAJORITY GOVERNMENT OF SDP AND THREE CENTRIST PARTIES: CENTER PARTY, LKP AND RKP. C. THREE-PARTY MAJORITY GOVERNMENT OF SKDL, SDP, AND CENTER PARTY

D. BOURGEOIS MAJORITY GOVERNMENT OF NON-LEFTIST PARTIES, ESSENTIALLY THE CENTRIST PARTIES PLUS CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND VHRISTIAN LEAGUE.

E. SDP MINORITY GOVERNMENT.

F. CENTRIST PARTIES (CENTER, LKP AND RKP) MINORITY GOVERNMENT.

G. CONTINUATION OF MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT IN A NON-POLITICAL CARETAKER ROLE UNTIL AFTER THE OCTOBER 17-18 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

H. NON-POLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE OR "EXPERTS" GOVERNMENT NAMED TO CARRY ON THROUGH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND UNTIL FORMATION OF A POLITICAL GOVERNMENT.

4. EACH OF THE OPTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 3 HAS BEEN MENTIONED BY ONE POLITICIAN OR ANOTHER, PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. ARGUMENTS CAN BE - AND ARE- MARSHALLED AGAINST EACH POSSIBILITY, AND THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON WHAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE OR WHEN. WHEN EVALUATING THE OPTIONS, SEVERAL CRITICAL FACTORS MUST BE CONSIDERED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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WHICH INFULENCE OR COMPLICATE ONE OR MORE OF THE POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT COMBINATIONS.

5. ONE CRITICAL FACTOR IS THE BASIC COMBINATION BETWEEN

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE COMMUNISTS ON THE ONE HAND AND THAT OF ALL OF THE OTHER PARTIES. THE COMMUNISTS WOULD FOLLOW A FULL EMPLOYMENT AND EXPANDED SOCIAL SERVICES

PROGRAM REGARDLESS OF INFLATIONARY CONSIDERATIONS, WHILE ALL OTHER PARTIES. TO ONE DEGREE OR ANOTHER, CONSIDER INFLATION AND LACK OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETIVENESS TO BE FINLAND'S MOST PRESSING ECONOMIC PROBLEM. THIS CON-FRONTATION - VERY MUCH IN EVIDENCE AS A MAJOR CAUSE OF THE MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT'S FALL - WOULD SEEM TO MOST OBSERVERS TO MAKE SKDL PARTICIPATION IN ANOTHER COALITION GOVERNMENT (OPTIONS A OR C ABOVE) UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, INTERESTINGLY, FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY (SKP) CHAIRMAN SAARINEN HIMSELF HAS SUGGESTED OPTION C, BUT BECAUSE OF THE BASIC ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES AMONG THE THREE GROUPS, HIS SUGGESTION WAS NOT TAKEN SERIOUSLY, MOREOVER, SKP VICE CHAIRMAN TAISTO SINISALO, HEAD OF THE HARDLINE COMMUNIST MINORITY, SAID THE FALL OF THE MIETTUNEN GOVERN-MENT PROVED THAT SKP PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKERS. SUCH DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE SKP ADD TO THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF SKDL PARTICIPATION IN A NEW GOVERNMENT.

6. A SECOND FACTOR IS THE HARD STAND TAKEN BY THE SDP
AGAINST THE CENTER PARTY'S DEMANDS FOR AGRICULTURAL
SUBSIDIES, A POSITION WHICH PRESENTS AN OBSTACLE TO
POSSIBLE SDP AND CENTER PARTY COOPERATION IN A FOUR-PARTY
MAJORITY GOVERNMENT (OPTION B). HOWEVER, WHILE SDP
OPPOSITION TO AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES WAS CONSIDERED A
MAJOR FACTOR IN THE BREAKUP OF THE MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT,
SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THE SDP OVER-EMPHASIZED THE ISSUE
IN ORDER TO BLUR, FOR ELECTORAL PURPOSES, SKP'S MORE
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE COMMINISTS OVER ECONOMIC
POLICY. THESE OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT IF THE PRICE IS
RIGHT, I.E., SDP PRIME MINISTERSHIP AND SOME CENTER PARTY
CONCESSIONS ON AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, THE SDP WOULD
PARTICIPATE IN A FOUR-PARTY COALTION GOVERNMENT. THERE
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IS, HOWEVER, ANOTHER FACTOR DISCOURAGING SDP PARTICIPATION.

7. THIS THIRD FACTOR IS THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE SKDL AND SDP FOR WORKER SUPPORT AND VOTES WHICH IN SOME SDP CIRCLES CREATES A CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN GOVERNMENT DURING DIFFICULT ECONOMIC TIMES UNLESS THE COMMUNISTS ALSO PARTICIPATE AND SHARE THE "BLAME" FOR TOUGH BUT NECESSARY GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC DEICISONS. THIS WAS THE MAJOR REASON WHY THE SDP IN THE FALL OF LAST YEAR STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE INCLUSION OF SKDL IN THE GOVERNMENT. NOW THAT IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT EFFECTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS IN GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE, THE SDP MAY BE MORE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT SKDL PARTICIPATION, EITHER WITH THE CENTER PARTIES (OPTION B) OR ALONE AS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT (OPTION E).

HOWEVER, THE SENTIMENT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED PUBLICLY BY PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL ULF SUNDQVIST THAT THE SDP SHOULD STAY OUT OF GOVERNMENT AND STRENGTHEN ITS OWN POSITION, LEAVING THE BOURGEOIS PARTIES TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT.

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8. A FOURTH FACTOR COMPLICATES THE POSSIBILITY OF A
CENTRIST PARTIES MINORITY GOVERNMENT (OPTION F) WHICH
WOULD BE DEPENDENT FOR SURVIVAL UPON SUBSTANTIAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY SUPPORT, OR OF A BOURGEOIS MAJORITY
GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (OPTION D).
THAT FACTOR IS THAT SINCE 1966 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY
HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN EXCLUDED FROM IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT
INFLUENCE BECAUSE OF THEIR SUPPOSED "UNRELIABILITY" WITH
RESPECT TO FINNISH/SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE THE CONSERVATIVES HAVE BEEN MAKING MAJOR EFFORTS FOR SEVERAL YEARS
TO GET BACK INTO THE GOOD GRACES OF PRESIDENT KEKKONEN,
IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD YET BE CONSIDERED
AS A GOVERNMENT COALTION PARTNER OR EVEN AS A PARTY

OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE SUPPORT IS NECESSARY FOR A GOVERNMENT'S SURVIVAL. THE LATTER EVENTUALITY IS, NEVERTHELESS, SUBSTANTIALLY MORE POSSIBLE THAN THE FORMER.

9. A FIFTH FACTOR IS THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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A NEW GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE SUB-MISSION OF THE BUDGET TO THE EDUSKUNTA AND TO THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. WHILE THE MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT FELL APART TRYING TO AGREE ON A BUDGET TO PRESENT TO THE EDUSKUNTA UPON ITS OPENING SEPTEMBER 21, THERE IS NO INTRINSIC REASON WHY THERE MUST BE A RUSH TO SUBMIT THE BUDGET, NOW THAT THE PRESSURE FROM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT IS OFF. LAST YEAR THE BUDGET WAS NOT SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT UNTIL NOVEMBER 10. WHEN IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE NON-POLITICAL LIINAMAA "EXPERTS"" GOVERNMENT WHICH PRECEDED THE MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT. ALSO, WITH MUNICIPAL ELEC-TIONS COMING UP IN LESS THAN ONE MONTH, SOME OBSERVERS HAVE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE POLITICAL PARTIES WILL WANT TO SEE A NEW POLITICAL GOVERNMENT FORMED AT THIS TIME. BECAUSE THERE IS NO REAL BUDGET PRESSURE AND BECAUSE OF THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. SOME POLITICIANS PREDICT THAT THE MIETTUNEN GOVERNMENT WILL CARRY ON IN A CARETAKER CAPACITY UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS (OPTION G) OR THAT PRESIDENT KEKKONEN WILL APPOINT A NON-POLITICAL "EXPERTS" GOVERNMENT (OPTION H) TO GOVERN THROUGH THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND UNTIL A NEW POLITICAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE FORMED.

9. THE FINAL, AND OVERRIDING, FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN ALL CALCULATIONS IS THE PERSON OF PRESIDENT URHO KEKKONEN. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT WILL BE HE WHO DETERMINES HOW AND WHEN A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED AND, TO A MAJOR EXTENT, WHICH PARTIES WILL PARTICIPATE IN IT. BECAUSE OF THE GREAT INFLUENCE EXERCISED BY KEKKONEN, AND GIVEN HIS PROVEN RECORD OF DRAMATIC AND UNEXPECTED ACTION, UNTIL HIS PREFERENCES ARE MADE KNOWN BOTH THE TIMING AND COMPOSITION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT MUST REMAIN ONLY SUBJECTS FOR SPECULATION. EARLY SPECULATION SEEMS TO FAVOR OPTIONS F OR H AND QUICK ACTION BY PRESIDENT KEKKONEN TO CALL A NEW GOVERNMENT.

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